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AN EMPIRICAL INDEX FOR LABOR MARKET DENSITY
Pieter A. Gautier* and Coen N. Teulings*
Abstract——We derive a structural index for labor market density based
on the Ellison-Glaeser index for industry concentration. The labor market
density index serves as a proxy for the number of workers that are
potentially available for jobs in a particular area. The index is based on
observed home-work location patterns. It is particularly useful for testing
theories where the scale of the market matters. We apply this index to a
standard wage equation and find that it explains almost half of the
cross-region wage variance.
I. Introduction
SEARCH frictions play an important role in the labormarket. Job seekers and vacancies do not meet instan-
taneously; their matching takes effort and time. The effi-
ciency of this matching process depends on the character-
istics of the labor market. An obvious factor that matters is
the density of the market: the more job seekers and vacan-
cies are available in a particular area, the easier it is for them
to find an acceptable match. Several authors have developed
empirical models along these lines; see for example Dia-
mond (1982), Burda and Profit (1996), Coles and Smith
(1998), Wasmer and Zenou (1999), Wheeler (2002), and
Glaeser and Maré (2001). Although there is a large literature
that suggests that returns to scale in job search are constant,
there is a good reason why the numbers of job seekers and
vacancies might matter: A larger labor market allows work-
ers and firms to be more choosy, so it reduces mismatch.
This effect is typically ignored in the empirical matching
literature, which is based on aggregated time series data.
A big obstacle in research in this area is that labor market
density is difficult to measure. One likely candidate for a
measure is simply the number of workers and/or jobs per
square mile. However, a number of serious drawbacks to
this measure immediately come to mind. First, it ignores the
role of infrastructure. What we are really interested in is not
the set of applicants within a certain distance of the job, but
the number of workers that are potentially available for a
job in a certain region. The relevant labor market area
should then be weighted by the number of highways and
public transport facilities. Moreover, when particular re-
gions are more attractive as residential areas, people might
be prepared to accept on average a longer commuting time.
These considerations suggest that we should look for an
index based on revealed preferences. The index that we
propose is based on observed home-work location patterns.
The idea is that we take the location of the job of a worker
as given and then analyze where that worker lives. To
clarify this idea, assume for the sake of argument that the
economy consists of a number of areas with an equal
number of inhabitants, say n. Then, if we observe that all
workers live in the same area as where they work, a given
job can only be occupied by n workers. This is typical for a
small-scale labor market. Alternatively, if workers working
in a particular location live in 10 different areas, then 10n
workers can potentially take jobs in that area and the scale
of the labor market is large. More specifically, our index can
be viewed as a model-based index of geographic labor
market density similar to the dartboard index for industry
concentration due to Ellison and Glaeser (1997; henceforth
EG). The index can take any value between 0 and 1. When
it is equal to 1, the only workers who work in a particular
area are the ones who live there. When it is equal to 0, the
labor market is extremely dense and we observe workers
from many different areas to be employed in it. In other
words, when many workers are available for a particular job
in a particular area, we call that area dense.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II derives the
index from location decisions of utility-maximizing agents.
Section III describes how the index can be constructed from
the 5% PUMS of the Census and how it can be linked to the
(C)MSA areas of the CPS. Finally, section IV gives an
illustration of how the index can be applied in a wage
equation and in a model for the cost-of-living index. We find
that 45% of the regional variation is captured by our density
index.
II. The Index
This section presents the density index, which is a special
case of EG’s index for industry concentration. Consider the
decision problem for the kth worker with a job in area w who
has to choose an area hk to live in. We take the distribution
of jobs across areas as given and define fw as the fraction of
jobs located in area w. Let the utility for area h be given by
log kwh  log  wh  εkwh, (1)
where the εkwh’s reflect idiosyncratic factors (like the rela-
tive preference for clean air, safety, theater availability, and
so on), which are assumed to be independent Weibull
random variables which are also independent of { wh}, and
 wh is a random location-specific variable, which is chosen
by nature at the start of the process. It reflects the attrac-
tiveness of living in a certain area (given that the agent’s job
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is in w) for a typical agent. Conditional on the realization of
the random variables  w1, . . . , wH, and given our assump-
tions on εkwh, we can write the probability that an agent
chooses area h as




which is a conditional logit model (see McFadden, 1973).
Note that pwh is a random variable because  wj are random
variables. We assume that the distribution of pwh is such that

w
fwpwh  h, (2)
varpwh  wh1  h, (3)
where h  [0, 1] and w  [0, 1]. Equation (2) implies
E( pwh)  h, where the expectation is taken over individ-
uals k. Let xh be the fraction of the total population that
chooses to live in area h. Then1
E xh  
w
fwpwh  h.
The parameter h drives the overall distribution of workers’
home location across areas h. Hence, ¥hh  1. An
appropriate choice of h reproduces the distribution of
home locations that is actually observed in the data, that is,
it puts more workers in New York than in Kansas. The
variance of pwh measures how sensitive the agent’s utility is
to region-specific factors. For jobs in nondense areas the
variance is likely to be high, because, given the location of
the job, there are few areas that have a sufficiently high
value of  wh, while the rest of the areas have  wh  0.
When w  1, the variance of pwh reaches a maximum
(since the maximum of the variance of a random variable
with support between 0 and 1 with mean h  [0, 1] is
h[1 	 h]). In that case, the variation in idiosyncratic
characteristics εkwh is dominated by the variation in the
location-specific factors, log  wh. When w  0, the
location decision is totally dominated by the agent’s idio-
syncratic taste factors. Region-specific factors do not matter.
This is the case in a fully integrated, dense labor market.
The agent’s decision on where to live is independent of the
location of the job, and each living area h is chosen with
probability xh. The parameter w can therefore be inter-
preted as a density index for region w. In other words, w
captures the importance of regional factors relative to idio-
syncratic taste factors of the agents.
Now we will define an unbiased estimator for w. Let swh
be the number of workers working in area w and living in
area h as a share of total employment in area w. Then:
Proposition 1. Consider the case where K workers,
distributed across work locations w with share fw, choose
their home location according to equations (1), (2), and (3).




























varswh  xhpwh  E2swh  xhpwh
 
h
 pwh  h
2.
The second step uses var(swh 	 xhpwh)  E[(swh 	
xh)2pwh] 	 E2(swh 	 xhpwh). The third step uses plimK3

var(swh 	 xhpwh)  0, E(swhpwh)  pwh, and E( xh) 





















where we use E( pwh)  h in the second equality and
¥hh  1 in the final equality. Rearranging terms and using
E( xh)  h gives (4). 
To illustrate how this index is related to the scale of the
labor market, consider a job in area w. Let there be N
residential areas, each populated by a single worker, let n be
the number of workers who are willing to work in area w,
and let all of them have equal probability of getting the job.
Hence, n is a measure for the scale of the labor market. The
probability for each of the workers of getting this job is 1/n,
and the probability for the rest of the population, N 	 n, is
1 Equation (2) is slightly more general than the condition E( pwh)  xh
applied by EG. The latter condition implies that xh is nonstochastic. This
seems to be inconsistent with their model, since xh depends on the
realizations of εkwh and must therefore be stochastic. However, this
difference in presentation has no implications for Proposition 1 below.
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equal to zero. In other words, pwh  1/n with probability
n/N, and pwh  0 with probability 1 	 n/N. Since the
variance of a Bernoulli trial with success rate: n/N is (1 	
n/N)n/N, the variance of pwh is V  (1/n)2[(1 	 n/N)n/N] 
(1/N)[1/n 	 1/N]. According to equation (3), this is equal to:
(1/N)(1 	 (1/N)). Solving for  and taking lim N3 
 gives
 	 (1/n). Hence, in this simple binomial example where
workers either do or do not belong to a market for a particular
job and where all workers in a market have an equal proba-
bility for that job,  is equal to the reciprocal of the scale of the
labor market.
The above analysis takes as a starting point the work area
of the worker and then determines the choice of the optimal
living area. We could also have proceeded the other way
around, by analyzing the choice of the optimal work area
conditional on the living area. The actual conditioning on
work area in our calculations is based on the notion that a
large fraction of city centers consists of offices. Then,
conditioning on living area would underestimate the density
of the city centers. Most people living in Manhattan are
likely to work in Manhattan, incorrectly suggesting that
Manhattan is a low-density area. However, most people
working in Manhattan live in other regions. Hence, by
conditioning on work areas we avoid the problem of the
mismeasurement of w in city centers.
Under the assumptions made, this index is independent of
its level of aggregation.2 Whether one measures location at
(for example) the state level or the county level should not
affect the calculated value of w for a state. However, this
requires that the values of { wh} be drawn independently of
the aggregation scheme of subregions into regions. Obvi-
ously, this assumption is violated in reality. In practice, any
aggregation merges adjacent subregions into a new region.
The values of { wh} for subregions within a region will
typically be correlated. The example below makes this clear.
Consider four regions of equal size ( xh  1/4), each
consisting of four agents and four jobs. In the first case all
regions form a fully integrated market; swh  1/4 for all h,
w, and w  0. In the second case, swh  1/ 2 for all h, w,
and w  1/3. This is typical for the situation where 1 and
2 as well as 3 and 4 are twin cities. In the third case there
are four fully separated markets: swh  1 for all h, w, and
w  1:
(1) w  0
w h  1 2 3 4
1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 1
(2) w  1/3
w h  1 2 3 4
1 2 2 0 0
2 2 2 0 0
3 0 0 2 2
4 0 0 2 2
(3) w  1
w h  1 2 3 4
w1 4 0 0 0
w2 0 4 0 0
w3 0 0 4 0
w4 0 0 0 4
When we combine regions 1 and 2 and regions 3 and 4 into
two new regions, we get
(1) ̂w  0
w h  1, 2 h3, 4
1, 2 4 4
3, 4 4 4
(2) ̂w  1
w h  1, 2 3, 4
1, 2 8 0
3, 4 0 8
(3) ̂w  1
w h  1, 2 3, 4
1, 2 8 0
3, 4 0 8
When w  1/3, combining regions 1 and 2 increases
w.3 The extreme cases are invariant to the aggregation of
regions. For the other cases, aggregation tends to overesti-
mate w. In the next section, we present estimates of w for
the United States and test whether aggregation affects the
results.
III. Data
A. Constructing the Index from Census Data
The U.S. Census data are well suited for the construction
of our index, because they contain detailed information on
both the area of residence and the work area at low levels of
aggregation. We use the 5% public-use micro samples
(PUMS) of the 1990 Census. The most disaggregate geo-
graphic unit in the Census is the public-use micro data area
(PUMA). A typical PUMA is populated by at least 100,000
persons and is identified by a five-digit number, which is
2 There are two ways to think about aggregation in this context: (1)
reducing the number of areas for which we calculate w and (2) taking
weighted averages of w over neighboring areas. The discussion in this
section is about (1); in section IV we consider (2).
3 Note that if we had used the combined regions 1,4 and 2,3 or 1,3 and
2,4, this would have reduced w, but in practice this is not relevant,
because aggregation schemes tend to combine adjacent and integrated
subregions.
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unique within states. In dense areas, PUMAs are a subset of
a single county, whereas in rural states, PUMAs typically
consist of several different counties. To construct our den-
sity index we also need information on the area where the
worker works (PUMAW). This is however defined at the
two-digit level (unique by state), which will be the level of
our analysis. With the method of the previous section we
were able to construct a w for each of the 1138 two-digit
PUMAs.
In calculating w, we only included the full-time em-
ployed workers and excluded Alaska and Hawaii. Since in
general, each area is very small compared to the whole
country, the denominator of (4) is close to 1 (namely, using
Census data, we found for the U.S. ¥w xh
2  0.0024), and
w is therefore almost entirely determined by h(swh 	
xh)2. To get an idea of the range of possible values w can
attain, we found w to be equal to 0.07 in northern New
Jersey, whereas for some areas in Arizona, Maine, Missouri,
Montana, Kansas, and Wyoming we found values of w as
high as 0.95. The distribution of PUMA’s population shares
is plotted in figure 1. Both the mean and the standard
deviation of these population shares are 0.001. It suggests
that we do not have to worry about aggregation bias. This is
confirmed by a simple OLS regression of log w on the log
population shares of the area, which shows that there exists
an insignificant positive relation between w and area size
(the elasticity is 0.02, t  0.56).
B. Using Additional Information from the CPS
For many economic applications, the CPS contains cru-
cial individual information which is not present in the
Census. That is why we aggregated up our index to the
(C)MSA  state level. This is not a trivial operation,
because there is no one-to-one match between the PUMAs
of the Census and the (C)MSA (central metropolitan area)
and state classification of the CPS. We therefore use the
following strategy. First, we match the PUMAWs to (C)M-
SAs, using the method of Jaeger et al. (1998). We aggregate
by taking weighted (by population share) averages of the
relevant w’s. In most states there are however areas which
do not belong to a (C)MSA. Those are typically rural areas.
For those areas we also calculated weighted average w’s
per state.4 Finally, there are some small (C)MSAs that
consist of only one PUMA. When those areas are isolated
(for example, Tucson, Phoenix) or close to the Mexican
border (El Paso), this overestimates w for the reasons we
discussed in section II. We therefore treat (C)MSAs con-
sisting of only one PUMA like the within-state areas that do
not belong to a (C)MSA. This leaves us with in total 164
w’s.
To illustrate the aggregation procedure, consider the fol-
lowing example for Indianapolis, IN. The Indianapolis
CMSA consists of four PUMAs, each with a unique Census.
In the CPS, Indianapolis is treated as a single geographical
unit. We take weighted (by xw) averages of Census to get a
unique CPS for Indianapolis.
Figure 2 plots density distributions for both the 1138
Census PUMAs and the 164 CPS areas. The mean for Census
is 0.597, and the standard deviation is 0.235; for CPS those
values are respectively 0.574 and 0.185. From this, we
conclude that we do not lose much variation in our index by
aggregating up to the (C)MSA  state level, suggesting that
the CPS regions are quite homogeneous with respect to their
. The overall shapes of the distributions are quite similar,
they are bimodal with one hump at   0.80; the other
hump is at   0.25 for the Census and at   0.40 for the
CPS.5
We expect w to be related to population density (mea-
sured in persons per square mile). Figure 3 is illustrative in
this respect. Figure 3 shows a map of all the counties in the
United States, where the darker areas are more densely
populated. In this figure we have inserted some values of
w, based on the Census PUMAs. We clearly see that
densely populated areas have smaller w’s. The correlation
between CPS and people per square mile is 	0.43.
IV. Application: Estimation of a Wage Equation
In this section we look at the effect of our labor market
density index on wages. This application merely serves as
an illustration. We do not have a narrow structural interpre-
tation of our estimation results. In the literature, several
reasons for the existence of cross-regional wage differenti-
ation have been put forward: regional differences in the
efficiency of the matching process, as in Teulings and
Gautier (2002) and Wheeler (2002); knowledge spillovers,
4 For the definitions of (C)M(S)As we refer to Appendix A. Our density
measures and relevant weights per PUMAW of the 1990 census and per
(C)MSA/MA of the CPS, as well as SAS formats for (C)MSAs and states,
can be found at http://www.tinbergen.nl/gautier/lmdensity.html.
5 See Appendix B for a full listing of .
FIGURE 1.—DENSITY OF AREA SIZES: MEAN  0.001, 2  0.001
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FIGURE 2.
FIGURE 3.—THE RELATION BETWEEN PERSONS PER SQUARE MILE AND CPS
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as in Lucas (1988) and Glaeser and Maré (2001); or com-
pensating differentials, as in Roback (1982). For our pur-
poses it is enough that wages are correlated with labor
market density. We are interested in the fraction of the
cross-regional variance in wages that can be attributed to
our labor market density index. If density matters, it should
pick up a substantial part of the cross-regional variation in
wages. We use both the March 1991 supplements of the
CPS and the 1% PUMS of the 1990 Census for our wage
equation. Most of our attention goes to the CPS results,
because that allows for a more accurate calculation of
earnings and hours worked. In the PUMS, working time was
measured as an interval variable, which makes the hourly
wage rate less accurate.6
Directly estimating the effect of  on log wages with OLS
gives an unbiased estimate of , but it produces downwardly
biased standard errors in the presence of within-region
correlation of the disturbances; see Moulton (1990). There-
fore, the following equations are estimated by OLS:
log wij  0  2X  jRj  εij, (5)
j  0  1  vj, (6)
where log wij is the log (gross) hourly wage of worker i
from region j, and X1 contains all the standard variables of
the wage equation;7 Rj is a set of region dummies. Equation
(5) was estimated once on all regions and once on the 95
(C)MSAs for which we have additional information on
people per square mile and cost of living. We experimented
in equation (6) with various extra controls. The results are
presented in table 1.
We can conclude from estimation 1 that our density index
explains 45% of the cross-regional wage variation that is not6 An additional problem of measuring the effect of labor market density
on wages at the PUMA level is, as the referees pointed out, that the
causality might be reversed. Firms in highly productive regions could post
higher wages to attract workers from other regions. In the CPS estimates,
this mechanism is not relevant, because there we use regions that consist
of multiple PUMAs, so that in general both home and work location are
in the same region. The mechanism described above would then generate
within-region wage differentials, whereas our estimates are based upon
between-region wage differentials.
7 The explanatory variables are: a constant, female, unmarried, female 
unmarried, black, two-digit occupation and industry dummies, dummies
for completed education (12, 14, 16, 18 years), education (years), and
cubic polynomials in experience, experience  education, female 
experience, female  (not married), and female  (not married) 




Var. N R2 Estimate t-Value
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Wage
1  150 0.454 	0.391 11.10
2  150 0.484 	0.403 11.43
avsize 6.109 1.41




4  95 0.242 	0.294 5.46
5  95 0.415 	0.185 3.64
ppsqm 0.096 4.12





Dependent Variable: Log Cost of Living
7  95 0.212 	0.348 5.24
8  95 0.531 	0.118 1.99
ppsqm 0.024 8.03





Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Wage (Census)
10  1097 0.204 	0.066 16.76
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explained by the standard observable worker characteristics.
The estimated value of 1 is highly statistically significant:
Workers living in an area with a  that is 1 standard
deviation (0.19) left from the mean earn 7.4% more than
people living in an area where  is equal to its mean. In
estimation 2 we include average PUMA size as an explan-
atory variable to test whether the potential aggregation bias
that we discussed in section II plays a role. It does not. Its
effect is not significant, and  remains almost the same.
Next, we add dummies for the main regions: North Central/
Midwest, South, and West (Northeast is control). Wages in
the Northeast turn out to be higher. Our density index only
decreases slightly. In estimation 5, we test whether control-
ling for people per square mile eliminates the effect of our
density index. This turns out not to be the case. 1 drops but
remainssignificant.Becauseweonlyhavepeople-per-square-
mile (ppsqm) data at the (C)MSA level, we also repeated
estimation 1 with the same regions as in estimation 5 to
check to what extent the fall in  is due to fewer observa-
tions or to including ppsqm; the result is estimation 4. It
turns out that the inclusion of ppsqm makes 1 fall from
	0.29 to 	0.19. The drop in  due to leaving the non-
(C)MSA areas out is similar in magnitude: from 	0.39 to
	0.29. In estimation 6 we included region dummies, and 1
remains stable at 	0.17 (3.11).
If, for the reasons we mentioned above, dense areas are
attractive and if the stock of real estate is to some extent
fixed, then the real estate owners receive rents. We therefore
expect our index to be correlated with the cost of living. To
see to what extent this is the case, we add the regional
cost-of-living index of Dumond, Hirsch, and MacPherson
(1999). This index is based on the American Chamber of
Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA) cost-of-
living index for the period 1985:4 through 1995:2. In
estimations 7, 8, and 9 we see that this measure is also
positively related to both our density index and people per
square mile.
In estimation 10, we estimate the effect of our density
index at the PUMA level of aggregation with data from the
1% PUMS of the Census; see Ruggles and Sobek (1997).8
The estimate of  in the equivalent of estimation 6 is
	0.066 (16.76). Again, we conclude that workers in denser
areas earn higher wages.9
V. Discussion
We have shown that we can give a meaningful structural
labor market interpretation of the Ellison and Glaeser
(1997) index of concentration. The large and significant
effect that our density index has on wages suggests that it
captures important effects. Our index is particularly useful
for testing theories that predict that the scale of the labor
market matters. From a theoretical point of view, our index
is more attractive than the obvious alternative: people per
square mile. This index is available for (C)MSA’s only. For
those regions for which it is available, our index and people
per square mile are correlated. However, both are statisti-
cally significant in a wage equation. In Teulings and Gautier
(2002), we successfully apply our density index to analyze
the effect of the efficiency of the search process on the
distribution of workers and jobs across regions.
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APPENDIX A
Definitions
● MSA: Relatively freestanding and not closely associated with other
MAs. Typically surrounded by nonmetropolitan areas. The title of an
MSA contains the name of its largest city and up to two additional
city names.
● CMSA: Consolidated metropolitan area. MA of more than 1 million
people, which may include one or more large urbanized counties that
display very strong internal economic and social links within a
CMSA. An example of a large CMSA is New York–New Jersey–
Long Island.
8 We have 224,271 observations.
9 When we aggregate up the Census regions to the CPS levels and place
the same restrictions on the hours-worked variable in the CPS, the Census
estimate of the density index remains considerably smaller than the CPS
one. The correlation between the sets of regional dummies obtained from
estimation 5, using the Census data and the CPS data, is only 0.31.
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APPENDIX B
TABLE B1.—STATES AND ASSOCIATED (C)MSAS RANKED FROM DENSE TO NONDENSE
Rank State (C)MSA  Rank State (C)MSA 
1 DC Washington 0.18201
2 New Jersey NY–North. NJ–Long Island 0.18420
3 Florida Orlando 0.19529
4 Massachusetts Boston–Lawernce–Salem–Lowell–Brockton 0.19993
5 Minnesota Minneapolis–St. Cloud 0.21236
6 Connecticut Hartford–New Britain–Middletown–Bristol 0.26075
7 Connecticut NY–North. NJ–Long Island 0.26413
8 New Jersey Philadelphia–Wilmington–Trenton 0.28888
9 Texas Dallas–Fort Worth 0.30358
10 Colorado Denver–Boulder 0.30739
11 Massachusetts Worcester 0.31041
12 Connecticut New Haven–Meriden 0.31172
13 Michigan Detroit–Ann Arbor 0.31810
14 Rhode Island Providence–Pawtucket–Woonsocket 0.31855
15 Georgia Atlanta 0.32859
16 New Jersey Atlantic City 0.33552
17 New York Buffalo–Niagara Falls 0.33560
18 Ohio Cleveland–Akron–Lorain 0.34439
19 Virginia Richmond–Petersburg 0.34729
20 New York NY–North. NJ–Long Island 0.34776
21 Michigan Lansing–East Lansing 0.35209
22 Virginia Washington 0.36757
23 Louisiana Baton Rouge 0.37122
24 Tennessee Chattanooga 0.37835
25 New York Albany–Schenectady–Troy 0.37913
26 California Los Angeles (city) 0.37934
27 Louisiana New Orleans 0.38304
28 Massachusetts Springfield 0.38791
29 New York Syracuse 0.38889
30 Massachusetts Providence–Pawtucket–Woonsocket 0.39096
31 Kentucky Louisville 0.39682
32 Indiana Chicago–Gary–Lake County 0.39885
33 Maryland Baltimore 0.40908
34 Michigan Grand Rapids 0.41137
35 Tennessee Knoxville 0.41209
36 Illinois St. Louis 0.41564
37 Florida Miami–Fort Lauderdale 0.41688
38 Oregon Portland 0.41916
39 Illinois Chicago–Gary–Lake County 0.41966
40 Kentucky Cincinnati–Hamilton 0.42248
41 Missouri St. Louis 0.42903
42 Maryland Washington 0.43077
43 Texas Houston–Galveston–Brazoria 0.43306
44 Connecticut Non-(C)MSA area 0.43436
45 Virginia Norfolk–Virginia Beach–Newport News 0.43863
46 Michigan Flint 0.44093
47 Illinois Rockford 0.44260
48 North Carolina Fayetteville 0.44308
49 Connecticut New London–Norwich 0.44369
50 Pennsylvania Philadelphia–Wilmington–Trenton 0.44455
51 Kansas Kansas City 0.44475
52 North Carolina Greensboro–Winston–Salem–High Point 0.45378
53 California Sacramento 0.47082
54 California Modesto 0.47128
55 Tennessee Memphis 0.48094
56 Texas Beaumont–Port Arthur 0.48404
57 Ohio Cincinnati–Hamilton 0.48589
58 Florida Melbourne–Titusville–Palm Bay 0.49493
59 Washington Spokane 0.49705
60 Pennsylvania Harrisburg–Lebanon–Carlisle 0.49721
61 Missouri Kansas City 0.49750
62 Indiana Fort Wayne 0.49753
63 South Carolina Columbia 0.50242
64 California Fresno 0.50661
65 New York Rochester 0.50816
66 Texas Austin 0.51424
67 Iowa Des Moines 0.51545
68 California San Francisco–Oakland–San Jose 0.51671
69 California Bakersfield 0.52003
70 Washington Seattle–Tacoma 0.53220
71 Mississippi Jackson 0.53408
72 Indiana Indianapolis 0.53501
73 Wisconsin Madison 0.53776
74 Tennessee Nashville 0.54252
75 Oregon Eugene–Springfield 0.54305
76 Illinois Peoria 0.54461
77 Pennsylvania Allentown–Bethlehem 0.55004
78 Massachusetts Non-(C)MSA area 0.55970
79 Kentucky Lexington–Fayette 0.56318
80 Illinois Davenport–Rock Island–Moline 0.56678
81 Oklahoma Oklahoma City 0.57660
82 Georgia Macon–Warner Robins 0.57871
83 Ohio Youngstown–Warren 0.58012
84 Nevada Reno 0.58201
85 Ohio Dayton–Springfield 0.58718
86 Nebraska Omaha 0.59182
87 Wisconsin Milwaukee–Racine 0.59276
88 South Carolina Charleston 0.59322
89 North Carolina Raleigh–Durham 0.59538
90 Colorado Colorado Springs 0.59608
91 Texas San Antonio 0.59681
92 Wisconsin Appleton–Oshkosh–Neenah 0.60155
93 North Carolina Charlotte–Gastonia–Rock Hill 0.60192
94 New Hampshire Non-(C)MSA area 0.60363
95 California Salinas–Seaside–Monterey 0.61512
96 Ohio Toledo 0.61773
97 Indiana Louisville 0.61824
98 Florida Fort Pierce 0.62039
99 Alabama Birmingham 0.62628
100 Alabama Montgomery 0.62861
101 Tennessee Johnson City–Kingsport–Bristol 0.62942
102 South Carolina Non-(C)MSA area 0.64862
103 Michigan Saginaw–Bay City–Midland 0.64866
104 Ohio Columbus 0.66128
105 South Carolina Greenville–Spartanburg 0.66141
106 Pennsylvania Pittsburgh–Beaver Valley 0.67295
107 Georgia Non-(C)MSA area 0.67496
108 Ohio Non-(C)MSA area 0.67521
109 Oklahoma Tulsa 0.67564
110 Indiana Non-(C)MSA area 0.68770
111 Delaware Non-(C)MSA area 0.69159
112 Maryland Non-(C)MSA area 0.69311
113 New York Binghamton 0.69981
114 Utah Salt Lake City–Ogden 0.71502
115 Vermont Non-(C)MSA area 0.71874
116 Florida Jacksonville 0.71967
117 Indiana Evansville 0.72104
118 Pennsylvania York 0.72320
119 Pennsylvania Scranton–Wilkes-Barre 0.72731
120 Mississippi Non-(C)MSA area 0.72741
121 Virginia Non-(C)MSA area 0.72983
122 West Virginia Non-(C)MSA area 0.73126
123 Alabama Non-(C)MSA area 0.73288
124 Georgia Augusta 0.73401
125 Iowa Non-(C)MSA area 0.73448
126 New York Utica–Rome 0.73627
127 North Carolina Non-(C)MSA area 0.74169
128 Maine Non-(C)MSA area 0.74180
129 Arkansas Little Rock–North Little Rock 0.74541
130 Kentucky Non-(C)MSA area 0.74660
131 Virginia Johnson City–Kingsport–Bristol 0.74663
132 Tennessee Non-(C)MSA area 0.75257
133 Michigan Non-(C)MSA area 0.75505
134 New York Non-(C)MSA area 0.75518
135 Illinois Non-(C)MSA area 0.75701
136 Florida Tampa–St. Petersburg–Clearwater 0.76119
137 Texas Killeen–Temple 0.76615
138 Wisconsin Non-(C)MSA area 0.76934
139 Texas Corpus Christi 0.76942
140 Arkansas Non-(C)MSA area 0.77266
141 Washington Non-(C)MSA area 0.77861
142 Missouri Non-(C)MSA area 0.79070
143 Minnesota Non-(C)MSA area 0.79186
144 Pennsylvania Non-(C)MSA area 0.79400
145 Alabama Mobile 0.80454
146 Louisiana Non-(C)MSA area 0.80639
147 Kansas Wichita 0.80993
148 New Mexico Non-(C)MSA area 0.82036
149 Florida Non-(C)MSA area 0.82273
150 North Dakota Non-(C)MSA area 0.82542
151 Colorado Non-(C)MSA area 0.85206
152 California Non-(C)MSA area 0.86129
153 Nebraska Non-(C)MSA area 0.86141
154 Idaho Non-(C)MSA area 0.86383
155 Kansas Non-(C)MSA area 0.86384
156 Oklahoma Non-(C)MSA area 0.87242
157 Oregon Non-(C)MSA area 0.87992
158 Utah Non-(C)MSA area 0.89160
159 Texas Non-(C)MSA area 0.89445
160 Arizona Non-(C)MSA area 0.91724
161 South Dakota Non-(C)MSA area 0.91771
162 Nevada Non-(C)MSA area 0.92344
163 Wyoming Non-(C)MSA area 0.93019
164 Montana Non-(C)MSA area 0.94790
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